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Religious Exemptions Under the
Free Exercise Clause: A Model of
Competing Authorities
Many religious individuals feel profoundly trapped between the
demands of their faith and the laws of the state. The relief that
such persons often seek is exemption from laws that, although con-
stitutionally sound, nevertheless infringe upon their religious be-
liefs. The basis for such relief can be found in the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment.'
Claims for religion-based exemptions under the free exercise
clause do not fit easily into American constitutional jurisprudence.
Most constitutional rights involve norms internal to society's value
system. Grants of religion-based exemptions, in contrast, require
that the state accommodate itself to external norms of conduct or
just treatment.2
Present free exercise doctrine, which has allowed some exemp-
tions under a balancing test derived from other aspects of First
Amendment law, is ad hoc and conceptually flawed. Courts ap-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion].") The Supreme Court declared the free exercise clause applicable to the states
in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
The question of religion-based exemptions from otherwise constitutional laws is a distinct
issue within free exercise doctrine. Cf. Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A
Turning Point? 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 217-18, 231 (singling out freedom from "admittedly
'secular' regulations"). Courts also apply the free exercise clause to hold unconstitutional
laws that discriminate on the basis of religion, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972)
(prison must provide Buddhist reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith comparable to
that afforded other prisoners); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (Jehovah's
Witnesses meeting may not be barred in public park open to other religious services), or
that exceed the permissible scope of government regulation, see, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (state may not compel students to recite pledge of
allegiance); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (state may not impose license re-
quirement on door-to-door distribution of religious literature). This Note refers to such
findings of unconstitutionality, in contrast to the granting of religion-based exemptions, as
the "general application" of the free exercise clause.
2. The fundamental decision to consider religion-based exemptions is itself founded
upon society's internal norms, but any particular claim for an exemption is derived from
the specific tenet of the claimant's religion. The uniqueness of religion-based exemptions
as a constitutional issue is highlighted by contrasting it with free speech doctrine. See
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (refusing to accept "the view that an ap-
parently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging
in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea").
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plying it have been insufficiently generous in granting exemptions,
and even when they have allowed them, have been prone to make
inappropriate substantive judgments.
A central premise of this Note is that religious liberty, as en-
shrined in the free exercise clause, is a pure value that should be
promoted to the greatest extent possible in a pluralistic society.
3
The Note argues that religion-based exemptions are necessary to a
system of religious liberty, yet can be understood only by looking
beyond standard constitutional principles. The Note first examines
the defects of current exemption doctrine. It then argues that the
courts should adopt instead a doctrine of "competing legal authori-
ties." That doctrine employs an analogy to the legal discipline of
conflict of laws, which has long grappled with claims based upon
externally derived norms. Finally, the Note suggests procedures by
which courts could apply the doctrine of competing authorities.
I. The Inadequacy of Religious Exemption Doctrine
Claims for religion-based exemptions have been lodged against a
variety of laws, including driver's license photograph require-
ments, 4 compulsory education requirements,5 tax laws, 6 unem-
ployment insurance rules, 7 narcotics statutes, 8 civil rights statutes, 9
3. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (purpose of free ex-
ercise clause is to "secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions
thereof by civil authority"). The guarantee of religious liberty is nurtured in part by a sub-
stantive commitment to the protection of religious life. See id. at 222 (free exercise clause
recognizes value of religious training, teaching, and observance); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("[wle are a religious people"); M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE
WILDERNESS 15-19 (1965) (religion clauses inspired in large part by evangelical principle
meant to protect religions from worldly corruption). Concurrent with this commitment,
however, the free exercise clause also protects the right of persons to be irreligious. See
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (state may not make belief in God condition of
holding public office). Moreover, the establishment clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion"), requires that statutes
have a secular legislative purpose, have a principal or primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion, and not foster excessive entanglement with religion. Wolman v. Wal-
ter, 433 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1977).
4. E.g., Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 197 Colo. 455, 593 P.2d 1363, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 885 (1979); Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380
N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. 1978).
5. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); State v. Kasuboski, 87 Wis. 2d 407,
275 N.W.2d 101 (Ct. App. 1978).
6. E.g., United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7 (1974) (withholding
tax); Jaggard v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913
(1979) (self-employment tax).
7. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd., 391 N.E.2d
1127 (Ind. 1979), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
8. E.g., People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (pe-
yote); Town v. State ex rel. Reno, 377 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1979), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 48 (1980) (marijuana).
9. E.g., Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
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labor laws, 10 snake-handling prohibitions," and bigamy proscrip-
tions.12 Serious judicial consideration of such claims is a relatively
recent,13  and still controversial,' 4  element of First Amend-
ment doctrine. The approach adopted by the courts has been ill-
conceived and unconvincing.' 5
A. Evolution of Exemption Doctrine
Debate over the framers' intent as to the scope of the free exer-
cise clause has been vigorous but inconclusive.' 6 The most accurate
statement may be that the framers did not contemplate the prob-
lems that would arise from the combination of increasing govern-
ment activity and growing religious diversity.' 7
In its earliest opinion on the exemption issue, the Supreme
434 U.S. 1063 (1978) (claim that private school's racial discrimination on religious grounds
was protected from civil rights action); Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597
(D.S.C. 1974), affd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975) (similar claim against federal funding
cutoff).
10. E.g., Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd on other grounds,
440 U.S. 490 (1979) (free exercise challenge to NLRB jurisdiction over lay teachers in pa-
rochial schools).
11. E.g., State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dismissed sub nom. Bunn v.
North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949) (denying religious defense to municipal ordinance
prohibiting handling of venomous and poisonous reptiles as to endanger public health,
safety, and welfare); State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 954 (1976) (upholding, and justifying as abatement of public nuisance, injunction
against snake handling by members of religious group).
12. E.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (transportation of plural wives as
violation of Mann Act); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (denying religious de-
fense to federal law forbidding bigamy in United States territories).
13. See Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115, 1139 (1973) (identifying
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), as turning point in doctrinal development).
14. See, e.g., M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLrrIcs 39-40 (1978) (criticizing religion-based
exemptions); Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 16-17 (1978) (same).
15. Cf. Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327, 329-30 (1969)
(present doctrine not predictable or coherent); Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Edu-
cation, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 244 (1973) (Su-
preme Court has not established a "doctrinal base").
16. See Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom, 41 ILL. L. REv. 53, 55-58
(1946) (historical argument inconclusive and misleading). Compare R. MORGAN, THE SU-
PREME COURT AND RELIGION 23 (1972) ("freedom of conscience" did not mean that govern-
ment could not force persons to do things that offended them) with Freeman, A Remonstra-
tion for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 806, 808-13 (1958) (protection of actions based upon
conscience included in motivation for religion clauses). The framers themselves may not
have had a common understanding. See M. MALBIN, supra note 14, at 19-37 (Madison likely
believed in religion-based exemptions, but others did not share his views).
17. See Gianella, Religious Liberty, Non-Establishment, and Doctrinal Development (pt. 1), 80
HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1387-90 (1967) (unlikely that authors of First Amendment appreciated
inner tension between the two religion clauses); Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying
Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1217, 1232-33 (specific problems that
now arise could not have been imagined by founding fathers).
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Court declared that only religious beliefs, not religiously-motivated
actions, were constitutionally protected.1 8 This belief-action distinc-
tion implicitly precluded the possibility of religion-based exemp-
tions.19 The Court eroded the belief-action distinction in the 1940s
in a series of decisions that upheld rights of religious expression.2 0
Those cases, however, rested heavily upon free speech considera-
tions21 and did not authorize religion-based exemptions.22
18. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (upholding polygamy conviction
of Utah Mormon). Commentators have found little intelligible content in the belief-action
distinction itself. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-8, at 838 (1978)
(distinction more apparent than real); Marcus, supra note 17, at 1233-35 (carried to logical
conclusion, distinction is ludicrous). Some commentators, however, have identified it with a
doctrine that would deny free exercise protection against laws that have valid secular objec-
tives. See R. MORGAN, supra note 16, at 41 (equating belief-action distinction with secular reg-
ulation rule); L. TRIBE, supra, § 14-8, at 837 (belief-action distinction can be understood most
clearly in terms of secular purpose requirement); cf. Gianella, supra note 17, at 1387
(Reynolds court itself would probably not have permitted interference with certain actions).
19. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (exemptions would "in ef-
fect ... permit every citizen to become a law unto himself"); cf. Hamilton v. Regents, 293
U.S. 245, 265-68 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring) (religious judgment cannot be "exalted
above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of government"). The logic of either
the belief-action distinction or the secular-purpose formula precludes constitutional protec-
tion from otherwise constitutional laws, and thereby forecloses the possibility of religion-
based exemptions. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940) ("[c]onsci-
entious scruples ... [do not relieve] the individual from obedience to a general law not
aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs").
20. E.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943) (distribution of religious
tracts is protected activity); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (First
Amendment embraces both freedom to believe and freedom to act, though latter cannot be
absolute). Those decisions also eroded the closely related secular-purpose rule. See West Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943) (permissible goals may not be ac-
complished by impermissible means); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940)
(same).
The belief-action distinction, though no longer an absolute guide in free exercise cases, re-
mains an important benchmark. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-27 (1978) (be-
cause provision barring clergymen from serving as delegates to state constitutional conven-
tion was aimed at act, absolute prohibition against infringement on "freedom to believe" not
engaged); State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 108-11 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 954 (1976) (compelling state interest may justify regulation of action or conduct).
21. E.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating
compulsory flag salute); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (invalidating ban on
door-to-door distribution of circulars); see M. HowE, supra note 3, at 109 ("[in nearly every
opinion ... Court ... [insisted] that whatever protection it was giving to religious speech
or conscience it would also give to non-religious speech or conviction"); Pfeffer, supra note
13, at 1130 (whenever free exercise claim stood alone, it was unsuccessful).
22. See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 635-36 (1943) (va-
lidity of compulsory flag salute must be framed in terms of overall constitutionality rather
than religion-based exemption); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943) (tax
on distribution of religious literature on its face violation of First Amendment). Though
some of the cases spoke of granting exemptions, they actually held that the challenged stat-
utes were facially overbroad insofar as the statutes reached religious activities. See, e.g.,
Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 575-78 (1944) (distributors of religious litera-
ture cannot be required to obtain bookseller's license). Such cases therefore represent a
general application of the free exercise clause. See note 1 supra.
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The Court took a decisive turn in 1963 in Sherbert v. Verner.23
Drawing heavily from other types of First Amendment cases,24 the
Court held that only a compelling state interest could justify impos-
ing a burden upon the exercise of religion 25 and that the state bore
the burden of demonstrating that no less restrictive regulation
could achieve its aims. 6 Nine years later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,27 the
Court reiterated that the Constitution sometimes requires religion-
based exemptions, 28 and it undertook a thorough analysis, weigh-
ing both the religious and state interests involved to determine
which should prevail. 9
The present state of exemption doctrine is unclear. Neither
Sherbert nor Yoder involved a pure case of exemption from an oth-
erwise constitutional law.3 0 Moreover, the courts have not been
consistent in outlining the structure of their balancing test.31
23. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh-Day Adventist awarded unemployment insurance
benefits denied her because she refused to work on Saturdays).
24. For its compelling state interest requirement, the Sherbert court cited NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), both free speech
cases. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963). For the less restrictive
alternative test, the Court cited Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (freedom of associ-
ation); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (freedom of speech); Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943) (freedom of speech and press); and Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.
147 (1939) (same). See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-08 (1963). Martin and
Schneider involved the distribution of religious literature and therefore had free exercise
overtones.
25. 374 U.S. at 403.
26. Id. at 407.
27. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (excusing Old Order Amish from compulsory education above
the eighth grade).
28. Id. at 220-21. The Court had never adequately reconciled the earlier Sherbert deci-
sion with Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (denying Orthodox Jew exemption
from Sunday-closing laws), and it seemed something of an aberration. See Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1322 (1970) (arguing
that Sherbert should not be followed); Pfeffer, supra note 13, at 1140 (until Yoder, it ap-
peared that Sherbert might have been isolated opinion).
29. 406 U.S. at 215-34.
30. Sherbert was complicated by South Carolina's decision that leaving a job for religious
reasons was not "good cause," 374 U.S. at 401, and by the state's express solicitude for
Sunday worshippers, id. at 406, both of which may have been contrary to the general ap-
plication of the free exercise clause. See P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 42
(1964) (Sherbert could have been decided on discrimination grounds.) Yoder, in turn, relied
in part upon the right of parents to play an important role in determining the education
of their children. See 406 U.S. at 213, 232-34. But cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628
n.8 (1978) (approving balancing process employed by lower courts in exemption cases).
The Supreme Court may clarify its religion-based exemptions doctrine when it decides
Thomas v. Review Bd., 391 N.E.2d 1127 (Ind. 1979), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980)
(denying unemployment insurance benefits to worker who quit job because of ostensible
religious scruples).
31. Some cases apply a two-tiered, modified balancing test, in which a sufficient degree
of religious interest triggers a burden on the state to demonstrate a compelling state inter-
est and the lack of a less restrictive alternative; if the burden is met, the statute is valid. See,
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Nevertheless, a rough composite test has emerged.3 2 A court
faced with a claim for a religion-based exemption from a govern-
ment regulation will first consider the sincerity of the religious
claim being advanced33 and the degree to which the challenged
regulation interferes with vital religious practice or belief.
3 4 It will
then weigh, on the other side of the balance, the importance of the
secular value underlying the rule,35 the impact of an exemption
upon the regulatory scheme, 36 and the availability of a less restric-
tive alternative. 37 The result of this balancing process determines
whether or not the court will grant an exemption.
B. Failures in Theory and Practice
The current exemption test is fundamentally flawed. As with any
ad hoc balancing test,38 it leads to inconsistent and unprincipled
e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 593
P.2d 1363, 1365 (Colo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979). Other cases apply a "true" balanc-
ing test that, although it also requires a threshold religious interest as a trigger, undertakes
a detailed consideration of the relative weights of the religious and state interests. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 725, 394
P.2d 813, 820, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76 (1964).
32. For a careful discussion of a "thoroughgoing balancing test," see Gianella, supra
note 17.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 445 (D.D.C. 1968); In re Grady,
61 Cal. 2d 887, 888, 394 P.2d 728, 729, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913 (1964); Dobkin v. District of
Columbia, 194 A.2d 657, 659 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963). The parties often stipulate the sincer-
ity of the religious proponent. See, e.g., Varga v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1113, 1115
(D. Md. 1979), aff'd, 618 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 593
P.2d 1363, 1364 (Colo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979).
34. This involves an examination of whether the relevant belief is "religious," see note
45 infra (discussing judicial definitions of religion), and how the state is impinging upon it,
see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972); Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pente-
costal House of Prayer, 380 N.E.2d 1225, 1228 (Ind. 1978). It may also involve inquiries
into such matters as whether the relevant belief is "central" to the religious faith, whether
the state infringes it directly or indirectly, and whether the religion would excuse non-
compliance. See pp. 360-61 infra (discussing such inquiries).
35. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-29 (1972); State ex rel. Swann v.
Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 113 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
36. See, e.g., Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 593 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Colo.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 885 (1979); In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 137, 125 N.W.2d 588, 589 (1963).
37. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Bureau of Motor Vehicles v.
Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 1978). Although commen-
tators have shown particular favor to the less restrictive alternative test, see, e.g., L. TRIBE,
supra note 18, § 14-10; Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding
of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805, 817-21 (1978), courts have of-
ten been quick to dismiss proposed alternative burdens, see, e.g., Johnson v. Motor Vehicle
Div., 593 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Colo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979) (other forms of identifi-
cation as substitute for picture on driver's license); State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d
99, 114 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976) (restrictions on snake handling as
alternative to prohibition).
38. Commentators distinguish between ad hoc balancing-the case-by-case weighing of
conflicting interests-and definitional balancing-the formulation of general rules from a
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decisions. 9 That problem is particularly acute in this area because
the contexts in which claims for exemptions arise are so varied. 40
But the present test's reliance upon ad hoc balancing is only one el-
ement of a more general failure in theory and practice. 41
1. Conceptual Defects
Religious-exemption doctrine, borrowed as it is from other
sources of constitutional law, does not address the distinctive fea-
tures of the exemption context. The doctrine suffers from three
conceptual defects.
First, courts have failed to develop an independent justification
for religion-based exemptions. Exemption doctrine has therefore
been unable to provide a principled answer to objections that
religion-based exemptions contradict the rule of law,42 violate gen-
eral notions of equal treatment,43 and violate the establishment
clause. 44 This failure has also prevented courts from defining, in a
weighing of competing principles. See Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935, 939-45
(1968); cf. Marcus, supra note 17, at 1242 (concluding that present free exercise doctrine is
essentially ad hoc, though Court has defined certain state interests as not compelling in any
case).
39. See Clark, supra note 15, at 330 (free exercise and other balancing tests are formless
and unprincipled, give little guidance to potential litigants, and can be overly deferential to
legislative judgment); Marcus, supra note 17, at 1240-41 (same).
40. See pp. 351-52 supra (examples of exemption claims); cf. Clark, supra note 15, at 330
(because particular interests involved in free exercise cases vary, uncertainties of ad hoc
test are especially great).
41. Courts could add some certainty to exemption doctrine by making greater use of
definitional balancing--distilling the balancing test into specific guidelines. Cf. Clark, supra
note 15 (suggesting guidelines for free exercise adjudication). But such definitional balanc-
ing, unaccompanied by a basic reconceptualization, would still suffer from many of the
same failures as does ad hoc balancing. Cf. DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest
for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEo. WASH. L.
REv., 161, 180 (1972) (neither ad hoc nor definitional balancing in free speech context ad-
equately focuses upon guarantee's purpose).
42. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940) (conscientious
beliefs should not relieve individuals of duty to obey valid laws); Kurland, supra note 14, at
16 (religion-based exemptions give protected persons "license to violate the laws with impu-
nity").
43. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 153-56 (1960) (only abstract rules laid
down irrespective of their particular application allow persons to be free and not subject to
will of others); cf. Clark, supra note 15, at 345, 348 (important factor in adjudicating ex-
emption claims should be whether state can impose alternative burdens that retain objec-
tive equality).
44. See Ely, supra note 28, at 1313-14 (combination of religion clauses requires that gov-
ernment not go out of its way in any context to favor or disfavor particular religion or reli-
gion generally); Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,
26, 96 (1961) (Constitution requires that government may not utilize religion as standard
for action or inaction); Kurland, supra note 14, at 15-18 (Supreme Court has not reconciled
religion-based exemptions with establishment clause); cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
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consistent fashion, what constitutes a cognizable religious claim.45
The courts' failure to develop a justification is compounded by
the focus in present doctrine upon preventing injuries to con-
science rather than enforcing claims of right; that is, the doctrine is
more concerned with the possibility that the government will cause
persons to suffer moral anguish than that it will violate their reli-
gious autonomy.46 Personal conscience is one of the least distinctive
elements of religious life47 and opponents of religion-based exemp-
tions can argue justifiably that such exemptions unfairly favor one
type of conscience over others.48
97, 103-04 (1968) (First Amendment mandates neutrality among religions and between re-
ligion and nonreligion); R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, in TAKING RIGHrs SERIOUSLY
184, 201 (1977) (secular society cannot prefer religious to nonreligious morality). But see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972) (establishment clause does not stand in
way of exemptions vital to protection of values promoted by free exercise clause); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (exemption may promote neutrality in face of religious
differences).
A related objection is that allowing religion-based exemptions forces courts to become
impermissibly enmeshed in the task of defining what is religious. See Weiss, Privilege, Pos-
ture, and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 622 (1964).
45. Courts have abandoned their traditional, purely theistic view of religion. Compare
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (defining religion as "relations to [one's] Creator,
and . . .obligations [those relations] impose of reverence for his being and character, and
of obedience to his will") with Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (rec-
ognizing many of world's religions are not theistic). Courts have also shown increased re-
luctance to limit the scope of what could be a religious belief. Compare Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333, 341-42 (1890) (to call advocacy of polygamy "a tenet of religion is to offend the
common sense of mankind") with United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (un-
usual religious beliefs are not less worthy of protection). Having rejected the old certainties,
however, courts have been unable to find a stable medium ground between narrow-
minded limitations and no limitations at all, and they have sometimes resorted to a dubious
search for doctrinal pedigree. See note 56 infra (describing and criticizing that inquiry).
46. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 385 (1974) (denial of veteran's benefits to
conscientious objector who performed alternative service does not force oppressive choice
upon him); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (denial of unemployment bene-
fits to Sabbatarian does force oppressive choice upon her); Clark, supra note 15, at 337
(framing one justification for free exercise clause in terms of avoiding pain to religious in-
dividuals); Gianella, supra note 17, at 1422-23 (courts regard "[glovemment regulations that
compel action contrary to conscience .. .as more serious interferences with religious lib-
erty than those which merely subject more or less passive religious dissenters to govern-
ment action").
47. See M. KoNvrrz, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 99 (1968) ("persons who avow
religious beliefs.., do not hold a monopoly on conscience"); M. WALZER, Conscientious Ob-
jction, in OBLIGATIONS 120, 133 (1970) (conscience of religious persons no more real than
that of other persons).
48. Se, e.g., Kurland, supra note 15, at 237-41; Weiss, supra note 44, at 622-23.
The First Amendment could be read to include a general "right of conscience." Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437, 465-66 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); M. KoNvrrz, supra
note 47, at 104-06. In some contexts, such a right has already been recognized. See Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state may not compel drivers to display official motto on
their license plates). Nevertheless, a broadly defined general "right of conscience" would
require a basic rethinking of democratic theory, cf. p. 362 infra (law takes precedence over
individual desire), and a commitment to a significantly more liberatarian form of govern-
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The second conceptual flaw of existing doctrine is that it errone-
ously treats consideration of an exemption claim as an assessment
of the constitutionality of a statute. Ordinarily, courts should re-
view laws to correct legislative mistake or abuse, 49 applying strict
scrutiny only if there is particular reason to suspect the legislative
product.50 In such cases, a court may appropriately undertake a
substantive evaluation of the law in order to determine whether the
legislative judgment was improper.5'
The nature of the adjudication is fundamentally different in the
exemption context.52 Because claims for exemption arise out of a
law's incidental conflict with externally derived norms, not out of
any legislative mistake or abuse, 53 a legislature cannot insure that
ment, cf. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA iX (1974) (any state with more than
very narrow functions violates persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things), while a
more narrowly defined right would leave many religious claims unprotected.
49. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 206-07 (1976) (constitu-
tional rules must be framed so that conscientious government could in theory comply
with them).
This account of judicial review makes no claim regarding precisely to what level of dili-
gence or good faith courts do or should hold legislatures; it merely claims that the process
implies some such standards. For example, though legislatures can perhaps all too easily
adhere to the rule of conduct inherent in the Supreme Court's racial discrimination doc-
trine, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (equal protection claim requires
proof of racially discriminatory purpose), they could also adhere to the rules of conduct
implicit in tests proposed by dissenting commentators, see, e.g., Perry, The Disproportionate
Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 559 (1977) (proposing that
disproportionate racial impact test be applied in contexts in which there is causal connec-
tion with historical pattern of discrimination).
50. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (strict
scrutiny should be applied when legislation appears on its face to violate constitutional pro-
hibition, and might apply when legislation restricts political process, or when it is directed
at particular minorities); cf. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 102-03 (1980) (judicial re-
view necessary when process of substantive decisionmaking cannot be trusted); L. TRIBE,
supra note 18, § 11-4, at 575 (strict scrutiny applied when protected values seem politically
fragile).
51. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978) ("[dlefer-
ence to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are
at stake"); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (usual judicial defer-
ence inappropriate when legislature intrudes upon rights of family; court must then care-
fully examine importance of competing interests); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-
Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 1,
30-32 (1973) (judicial "second-guessing" of legislative judgment in abortion decisions nec-
cessary because of factors prejudicing legislative process).
52. Commentators attempting to develop general standards of judicial review have
noted the anomalous treatment of claims for religion-based exemptions. See Eisenberg, Dis-
proportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv.
36, 165-66 (1977) (contrasting impact analysis in free exercise cases with motive require-
ment in equal protection cases); Ely, supra note 28, at 1315-17 (free exercise cases should
not be determined on basis of impact per se).
53. This is true by hypothesis. See p. 350 supra (discussing nature of exemption claims).
Not all claims for exemptions are in fact against laws that are otherwise clearly constitu-
tional. See p. 354 supra (discussing Sherbert and Yoder).
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its laws will not be susceptible to claims of interference in the exer-
cise of religion. 54 Therefore, courts are placed in the position of
scrutinizing possibly every enactment to determine whether it is
justified by a compelling state interest.55
The third conceptual defect of exemption doctrine is its exces-
sive intrusion into religious autonomy.56 The intrusion occurs in
54. Even when a legislature includes specific religious exemptions in a statute, claims
outside the scope of the legislative provision are likely t6 be made. See, e.g., Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (claiming exemption from draft based upon religious
objection to particular war rather than all war); Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics & Danger-
ous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1115 (1973) (claiming ex-
emption from narcotics statute despite failure to be member of religious group qualifying
for exemption under regulations).
55. See Ely, supra note 28, at 1316 (most government actions affect some religions, and
it is impossible that all such actions are unconstitutional); Weiss & Wizner, Pot, Prayer, Poli-
tics, and Privacy: The Right to Cut Your Own Throat in Your Own Way, 54 IOWA L. REv. 709,
716-17 (1969) (assessing amount of damage that may result from unlawful act is not
proper judicial function).
Some commentators urge that in evaluating whether a state interest is compelling, courts
should only measure the incremental benefit of applying the law to those who may be eligi-
ble for an exemption. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 14-10, at 855; Clark, supra note 15, at
331. This method makes some sense when society's only interest in enforcing a legal rule
in individual cases is. that the aggregate result furthers some given goal. One example may
be the rule that persons acquire a social security number. See Stevens v. Berger, 428 F.
Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (allowing exemption and arguing that impact upon aggregate
benefit of rule would be minimal). In the case of a great many, if not most, laws, however,
society is concerned with individual enforcement as well as aggregate effect, so that
measuring incremental benefit is inextricably tied to measuring general compellingness.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239-40 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (dis-
cussing benefits to children of compulsory education); J.F.K. Memorial Hosp. v. Heston,
58 N.J. 576, 580-84, 279 A.2d 670, 672-74 (1971) (asserting state interest in preserving in-
dividual lives); cf. R. DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 82, 91 (1977)
(distinguishing individuated and nonindividuated political aims). Even when the incremen-
tal benefit of a law seems easily quantifiable in some respects, other factors may be at work.
The goal of a progressive tax system, for example, is not only to raise revenue, but also to
equalize incomes. See Blum & Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L.
REV. 417, 519-20 (1952).
56. See Weiss, supra note 44, at 622 (assessing religious beliefs in itself intrudes into reli-
gious freedom).
The use of intrusive and improper tests has extended into the process of determining
whether particular beliefs of religious groups are themselves religious. Courts have been
unable to define adequately what constitutes a religious belief. See note 45 supra; cf.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (distinguishing religious from personal
and philosophical beliefs, without attempting to define either). Courts have therefore re-
sorted to dubious tests of doctrinal pedigree. See, e.g., id. at 216-18 (concluding Amish ob-
jection to compulsory education was religious because shared by organized group, derived
from scripture, and long held); State v. Kasuboski, 87 Wis. 2d 407, 414-18, 275 N.W.2d 101,
104-06 (Ct. App. 1978) (applying Yoder test to conclude that auxiliary church's objection
to education in local public school was personal and philosophical rather than religious).
Such tests fail to recognize that the right of a religion to change or interpret its doctrine is
itself protected by the First Amendment, cf. Presbyterian Church in the United States v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969) (courts
may not use "departure-from-doctrine" rule in resolving church property disputes), and
that many religions ascribe to individuals the right to interpret religious doctrine, see note
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two respects: in weighing the religious interests at stake and in fo-
cusing upon injuries to conscience. Though any exemptions
scheme must determine when religious interests are at stake,5 7 cur-
rent doctrine goes beyond such threshold tests, differentiating
among religious claims so that a court can weigh them against gov-
ernment interests.58 Courts have relied upon a distinction between
activities central to a religion's way of life and those that are inci-
dental parts of religious belief.59 This inquiry into centrality is be-
yond the practical6" and institutional 6' competence of courts. More-
over, the very notion of centrality is so vague that it can obscure
the use of even less defensible distinctions.
62
In addition, the doctrine's focus upon preventing injuries to con-
science rather than enforcing claims of right engenders a number
of pernicious distinctions. Courts have held, for example, that gov-
ernment may impose indirect burdens upon the exercise of reli-
115 infra (citing examples). Inquiries into doctrinal pedigree favor well-documented and
familiar religious faiths without justifying how that preference is anything more than gra-
tuitous.
57. But cf. note 48 supra (discussing possibility of recognizing general "right of con-
science").
58. See pp. 354-55 supra (describing balancing test). The need to differentiate among
religious claims is most evident in cases applying a "true," rather than a modified, balanc-
ing test, since, in such cases, courts must weigh the importance of both the religious and
state interests at stake. See note 31 supra (discussing two forms of test).
59. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1972) (compulsory education
law caused "grave interference with important Amish religious tenets"); People v. Woody,
61 Cal. 2d 716, 725, 394 P.2d 813, 820, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76 (1964) (peyote was "sine qua
non of defendants' faith"); cf. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 861 (5th Cir. 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (distinguishing Woody on centrality issue).
60. See M. KONVITZ, supra note 47, at 77-79 (discovering essence of particular religion
difficult even for theologians; religions have survived loss of even apparently fundamental
features). Among the dangers inherent in the "centrality" inquiry is the natural tendency
to use familiar criteria taken from general experience. See, e.g., Brown v. Dade Christian
Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 321 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (importance of belief in racial segregation minimized because
disobedience would not endanger salvation); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720-21, 394
P.2d 813, 817-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73-74 (1964) (comparing peyote cult's beliefs and prac-
tices to those of more familiar groups).
61. See M. KONVITZ, supra note 47, at 79 (judicial efforts to find essence of particular
religion equivalent to defining what one may label orthodox or heretical); cf. Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (civil courts may not judge relative importance of doctrines of
religious group); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871) ("[tlhe law knows no
heresy").
62. For example, the centrality of an activity may be defined in terms of its sacramental
significance, see People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 721-22, 725, 394 P.2d 813, 817-18, 820,
40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73-74, 76 (1964), thus excluding religions that believe in communion with
God through deeds rather than sacraments, see, e.g., A. HESCHEL, GOD IN SEARCH OF MAN
281-92 (1955) (discussing role of "mitzvot" in Judaism); THE LAws OF MANu 30-31 (G.
Biihler trans. 1886) (discussing "dharma" in Hinduism).
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gion even when it cannot directly regulate religion-related activ-
ity, 3 that it may compel violation of religious doctrine if the reli-
gion does not blame the believer for such compelled violations, 64
and that it may coerce compliance with a law even if it could
not punish noncompliance. 65
2. Practical Defects
The structure of present doctrine allows courts to be inconsistent
and illiberal. Though courts have granted a number of exemp-
tions,66 they have also made dubious findings that a state has a
compelling interest in requiring, for example, driver's license ap-
plicants to be photographed,67 persons willing to pay annual taxes
to participate in the withholding tax system, 8 and adult hospital
patients to receive blood transfusions. 69 The adjudicative process,
moreover, has often involved impermissible judgments as to the
63. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 385 (1974) (denial of veteran's benefits
to conscientious objector who performed alternative service only imposes at most indirect
burden on him); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961) (Sunday-closing laws
only an indirect burden on Orthodox Jew who closes his store on Saturday). But see
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 417-18 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) (Sherbert elimi-
nates distinction between direct and indirect burdens). "Indirect" burdens can be more
punishing than "direct" ones. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (di-
rect $5 fine) with Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601 (1961) (indirectly caused loss of
business).
64. See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (compulsory blood transfusion); United States v.
George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 753 (D. Conn. 1965) (same). Such a principle penalizes religions
that have devised mechanisms for coping under repressive regimes, see note 116 infra (dis-
tinguishing different types of religious deference to state authority), and thereby allows
the state to become one of those regimes.
65. See, e.g., J.F.K. Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 582, 279 A.2d 670, 673
(1971) (compulsory life-saving treatment); cf. Clark, supra note 15, at 347, 353 (arguing
criminal penalties may be inappropriate if compliance can be coerced).
66. See Shetreet, Exemptions and Privieges on Grounds of Religion and Conscience, 62 Ky.
L.J. 377, 377-91 (1974) (discussing both legislatively and judicially created exemptions).
67. Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 197 Colo. 455, 593 P.2d 1363, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
885 (1979). The Johnson court was too uncritical in accepting the state's claim of compelling
interest, and failed to take sufficient account of less restrictive alternatives. Cf Bureau of
Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. 1978)
(granting exemption).
68. United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7 (1974) (relying upon
Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421 (a)). An incremental-benefits analysis, see note 55 supra,
should have been dispositive in this case: whatever may be the total administrative advan-
tage of the withholding tax system, the government would lose little if a small group of
persons waited to pay taxes until the end of the year.
69. In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978 (1964); J.F.K. Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670
(1971). But see Estate of Brooks, 32 111. 2d 361, 373, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965) (forbid-
ding compulsion in absence of clear and present danger to society).
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substantive worth of the beliefs being asserted;7 0 rather than bal-
ancing religious freedoms against state interests, many courts have
in effect evaluated the desirability of the religious behaviour as an
alternative to the state's general norm. 71
II. The Doctrine of Competing Authorities
The free exercise clause reflects a commitment to the protection
of religious liberty.72 But simply asserting this commitment does
not explain how religion-based exemptions relate to either reli-
gious liberty or other basic values. That explanation can be found
in approaching religion-based exemptions from a new direction:
not as civil liberties in the ordinary sense, but rather as accom-
modations to competing sources of authority, an approach analo-
gous to conflict of laws determinations. 73  This doctrine of
competing authorities could instill in courts a more self-confidently
generous attitude toward religious claims.
A. The Distinctive Nature of Religious Authority
A basic premise of democratic theory is that when the govern-
ment acts within the limits of its authority, it has the right to expect
that its laws will take precedence over individual belief.74 Religion
70. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222-27 (1972) (implied approval of Am-
ish alternative life style); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1964) (implied sympathy with Native American Church use of peyote as sacrament and
object of worship).
71. See Burkholder, "The Law Knows No Heresy": Marginal Religious Movements and the
Courts, in RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 27, 45 (I. Zaretsky & M.
Leone, eds. 1974). Such judgments themselves violate the First Amendment. See United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (courts may not inquire into truth or worth of
religious beliefs).
72. See p. 351 supra (pure value of religious liberty nurtured in part by commitment to
protection of religious life).
73. Commentators have often employed models and analogies to give meaning to the
bare texts of First Amendment guarantees. See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 22-27 (1948) (rationale and parameters of free speech
clause can best be understood by analogy to rules governing "town meeting"); Stewart, "Or
of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-35 (1975) (free press guarantee can be understood
as granting to press institutional rights analogous to that of branch of government).
Although some commentators on the religion clauses have used rhetoric that might sup-
port an analogy between religion-based exemptions and conflict of laws determinations,
none has proposed explicit reference to the distinct legal doctrine of conflict of laws. See,
e.g., Berger & Neuhaus, Foreword to CHURCH, STATE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (J. Mechling ed.
1978) (unpaginated) (jurisdictional claims of state and religion inevitably run into conflict);
Wright, Book Review, 38 MINN. L. REv. 87, 88 (1953) (courts assert that "state is free to
punish violations of its law, while God punishes violations of His Law. It is left to the indi-
vidual to decide which code he will obey.")
74. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) ("concept of ordered liberty pre-
cludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which so-
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poses a special challenge to this theory. Although religion can be
defined in many ways,75 that challenge is best understood by refer-
ence to three fundamental attributes generally associated with reli-
gion: it influences human behaviour; 76 its adherents believe that its
principles are authoritative;7 7 and the source of that authority is
perceived to transcend both individual conscience 78 and the state. 79
These three attributes describe commonly recognized, God-
believing, organized religions, but can extend as well to creeds that
are nontheistic or noninstitutional. The attributes do not, however,
apply to beliefs that are not purported to be compelled by a source
beyond human judgment. Thus, Buddhism, a nontheistic reli-
gion,8 has the attributes of religion upon which this discussion fo-
cuses, as does a person's sense that God, or the cosmos, forces him
ciety as a whole has important interests"). The supremacy of law over individual desire
plays an important role in the basic sources of liberal democratic theory. See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST No. 2 (J. Jay); J. LocKE, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, in Two TREA-
TISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 129-31 (Hafner ed. 1947). Modern writers have expanded
on this principle. See, e.g., J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 212, 368-71 (1971) (liberty of
conscience limited by common interest in public order and security; conscientious refusal
distinguished from politically aimed civil disobedienci ); P. SINGER, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
OBEDIENCE 59 (1973) (special reasons exist for obeying law in democracy); cf. G. POGGI,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE 101 (1978) (modern state legitimizes its rule by
positive law enacted in accordance with constitutional rules).
75. See Clark, supra note 15, at 339-40 (distinguishing subject matter, sociological, and
psychological definitions of religion).
76. See P. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY 40-41 (1967) (religious ideation grounded in
religious activity); 2 G. VAN DER LEEUW, RELIGION IN ESSENCE AND MANIFESTATION 340 (J.
Turner trans. 1963) (religious revelation leads persons into fixed course of activity); J.
WACH, THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGIONS 36-37 (1958) (religion issues in imperatives
to action).
77. See notes 82-83 infra (religion much like civil government); W. CLARK, THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF RELIGION 22-23 (1958) (religious person attempts to harmonize his life with di-
vine will); Geertz, Religion: Anthropological Study, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 398, 406 (1968) (religion "relates a view of the ultimate nature of reality
to a set of ideas of how man is well advised, even obligated, to live").
78. See P. BERGER, supra note 76, at 33-34 (religion legitimates social institutions by
locating them within sacred and cosmic frame of reference that transcends both history
and man); M. BUBER, I AND THOU 123-68 (W. Kaufman trans. 1970) (religion is encounter
with unconditional You); W. SmrrH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION 173 (1964) ("The
traditions evolve. Men's faith varies. God endures.")
79. See Berger & Neuhaus, supra note 73 ("[a]uthentic religion ... must refer to a sov-
ereignty that transcends the authority of the state"); Lekachman, The Perils of Power, in
THE CHURCHES AND THE PUBLIC 5, 7 (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions 1960)
(because they justify their actions at least in part by appeals to divine inspiration, churches
cannot accept temporal judgments on their spiritual mission).
Recognizing the distinct nature of religious belief does not, however, require abandoning
more skeptical explanations for that belief. Cf. W. JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS
EXPERIENCE 19-26 (1902) (psychological and physiological explanations of religious emotion
do not exclude its study as distinct spiritual phenomenon).
80. See H. VON GLASSENAPP, BUDDHISM-A NoN-THEISTIC RELIGION 48-53 (I. Schloegl
trans. 1970) (Buddhism refers to an impersonal but fixed cosmic order).
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into a pattern of behaviour. On the other hand, a personal belief
or organized creed that does not refer to a transcendent and au-
thoritative source for that belief, but instead relies upon human
reason or intuition, lacks these attributes.
Religious concerns can extend at least as wide as proper govern-
mental concerns,81 and the two may therefore come into conflict.
To the extent that a religious doctrine refers to a behavioral, au-
thoritative, and transcendent system of commands, it is itself much
like a civil government.8 2 Many religions have highly articulated le-
gal codes,8 3 and many postulate punishment for disobedience.8 4
The conceded preference of state authority over individual be-
lief therefore cannot apply unproblematically. For government to
reduce the role of religion to that of a system of belief, or even that
of belief combined with a narrow range of actions,8 5 would be to
ignore the behavioral, authoritative, and transcendent elements of
religion. Such a course would not merely disadvantage a few sects
or individuals, but would be a profoundly secularizing act.86 The
alternative, for a society that values religion, is to read the free ex-
81. See, e.g., D. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR 17 (1962) (Jehovah's Witnesses
base all actions upon religious beliefs); P. WEISS, THE GOD WE SEEK 159 (1964) ("[elvery-
thing can be looked at from a religious viewpoint"); Dorff, Judaism as a Religious Legal Sys-
tem, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1331, 1333 (1978) (large segments of Jewish law cover subjects ordi-
narily considered secular).
82. See K. BARTH, The Christian Community and the Civil Community, in AGAINST THE
STREAM 15, 18-19 (R. Smith ed. 1954) (Christian community, as well as civil community,
lives and works within framework of law binding upon all members); H. KELSEN, GEN-
ERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 20 (A. Wedberg trans. 1961) (religion closer to law than is
morality). The analogy can be reversed. See, e.g., Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96
DAEDALUS I (1967) (American political ideology includes religious component).
83. See, e.g., J. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY 58-62 (1963) (describing Amish "ordnung," or
rules of church community); J. MCKENZIE, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH 25-26 (1969)
(describing canon law); Dorff, supra note 81 (describing biblical and Talmudic system of
law).
84. See, e.g., J. MCKENZIE, supra note 83, at 156 (mortal sin separates man permanently
from union with God); D. MANWARING, supra note 81, at 20 (Jehovah's Witnesses believe
that a "Witness who backslides in any substantial matter of doctrine or conduct is doomed
beyond hope of redemption").
85. See Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A Sociological Approach, 67 MICH. L. REv.
679, 697-99 (1969) (distinguishing between "belief," "therapy," "worship," and "ethical action"
subsystems of religion; arguing that first two should be protected absolutely, third pro-
tected conditionally, and last unprotected); Weiss, supra note 44, at 608 (arguing that only
religious belief and religious action that has no worldly consequences should be protected).
86. Cf. A. GREELEY, RELIGION IN THE YEAR 2000, at 21 (1969) (meanings of seculariza-
tion include relegation of religion to private sphere of human activity and lack of influence
by religion on human behaviour); R. MEHL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF PROTESTANTISm 61 (J.
Farley trans. 1970) (at extreme of secularization, "religion no longer is considered as any-




ercise clause as, in part, granting limited recognition to the reli-
gious source of authority. 87
B. The Conflict of Laws Analogy
A doctrine based upon recognition of competing authorities is
best considered in the context of an authority-recognizing doctrine
such as conflict of laws. Conflict of laws doctrine is consulted by the
courts of an adjudicatory forum when a dispute involves the laws
of other jurisdictions. 88 Among the techniques used in conflict of
laws are mechanical rules based upon the situs of crucial events,8 9
flexible inquiries into which territory has the most significant rela-
tionship to a set of events, 90 and considerations of the functions of
the divergent laws and the interests of the respective jurisdictions
in having their laws govern the dispute. 91
87. The notion of granting legal recognition to religious authority is not novel. Ecclesi-
astical courts had broad jurisdiction in medieval England. See S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 13-15 (1969); Jones, The Two Laws in England: The Later
Middle Ages, 11 J. CHURCH & STATE 111 (1969). Today, various nations grant religious insti-
tutions particular powers. See, e.g., Rubinstein, Law and Religion in Israel, in JEWISH LAW IN
ANCIENT AND MODERN ISRAEL 190, 190-210 (H. Cohn ed. 1971) (describing Israeli religious
courts); Taylor, Church and State in Scotland, 2 JUR. REv. 121 (1957) (describing established
status of Church of Scotland). Even in the United States, religous institutions have virtually
absolute autonomy over their internal governance. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25 (1976); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727
(1871). One recent work suggests that, in order to reduce the impersonality and bureau-
cratic oppressiveness of the modern "welfare state," public policy and constitutional doc-
trine should protect and foster the role of religious institutions, as well as the neighbor-
hood, family, and voluntary associations, as "mediating structures." P. BERGER & R.
NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE 1-3, 26-33 (1977).
The grant of recognition proposed in this Note differs from all of the above in two re-
spects. First, the grant is not limited to a particular range of subject matter. Second, it does
not extend to giving any adjudicative or administrative role to religious institutions beyond
their claim to be transmitting or interpreting the dictates of the religious source of author-
ity.
88. See G. CHESHIRE & P. NORTH, CHESHIRE'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (10th ed.
1979) [hereinafter cited as CHESHIRE]; R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 2, at 3
(3d ed. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS].
89. For example, the law applicable to a tort is often determined by the place where
the injury occurred. See CHESHIRE, supra note 88, at 259; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra
note 88, § 146.
90. See, e.g., CHESHIRE, supra note 88, at 260-63 (arguable that foreign tort should be
adjudged according to social environment in which it was committed); RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICTS, supra note 88, § 145 (contacts relevant to determing which state has most signif-
icant relationship to alleged tort include place where injury occurred, place where conduct
causing injury occurred, domicile of parties, and place where relationship between parties,
if any, is centered).
91. See Seidelson, Interest Analysis: For Those Who Like It and Those Who Don't, 11 DUQ. L.
REv. 283, 304-09 (1973) (courts should look to whether potentially interested states have
substantial interest in issue presented). But cf. R. LEFLAR, supra note 88, § 92, at 185-86
(discussing drawbacks of approach).
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1. Establishing the Analogy
A useful analogy can be drawn between religion-based exemp-
tions and conflict of laws. 92 Both are responses to claims that cer-
tain behaviour can be appropriately judged only by reference to an
alien legal norm. The justification for religion-based exemptions
arises from a gap in democratic theory: the state implicitly assumes
that it is the only external legal authority that governs persons. Re-
ligious doctrine, however, has many of the characteristics of a legal
system and can contradict secular law. The case for conflict of
laws93 arises from a similar gap in conventional jurisprudential
theory: systems of substantive law implicitly assume universal appli-
cation.94 Each nation, however, has its own system of substantive
law, and those systems can collide. 95 When individuals have con-
formed their behaviour to or acquired rights under a foreign legal
92. The ambiguity of much of modern conflicts doctrine may make it appear to be a
poor source of guidance for other fields of law. Cf. von Mehren, Choice of Law and the
Problem of Justice, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring 1977, at 27, 27 (choice of law problems
often seem intractable). But the analogy here is framed in such a way as to avoid most of
these complexities. See note 100 infra (discussing territorial principle); note 102 infra (dis-
cussing third-party rule).
93. Conflict of laws principles are not logically inevitable; adjudicatory forums could
always apply their own law to disputes before them or simply refuse to hear disputes
involving a foreign element. See A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 6 (9th ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as DICEY]; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 88, § 1, Com-
ment c. There are in fact commentators who advocate that forums regularly apply their
own law. See, e.g., B. CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in SE-
LECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 183-84 (1963) (even in cases involving for-
eign elements, courts should normally apply law of forum); Ehrenzweig, The Lex
Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. REV. 637, 637, 643-45 (1960) (applica-
tion of forum law should be presumptive rule in conflict of laws). The existence of a fo-
rum preference school of conflict of laws actually strengthens the analogy between
religion-based exemptions and conflict of laws by demonstrating that in both contexts there
is a reasonable, if not ultimately compelling, argument for refusing to defer to the foreign
source of authority. In this connection, it is significant that even the strongest advocates of
forum preference never proposed that the forum's law always apply, see B. CURRIE, supra,
at 183-84 (forum law should apply unless forum has no interest in application of its pol-
icy); Ehrenzweig, supra, at 637, 643-45 (factors such as intentions of parties may justify ex-
ceptions to lexfori presumption), that most commentators have remained unconvinced by
the forum preference school, see, e.g., CHESHIRE, supra note 88, at 3-4, 258-59 (strict lexfori
rule would often lead to unjust results); R. LEFLAR, supra note 88, § 90, at 181-82 (mere fo-
rum preference is not valid reason for choice-of-law result), and that the leading members
of the school have modified their own views in response to criticism, see A. EHRENZWEIG,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 62-65 (1967) (discussing both Currie and Ehrenzweig).
94. See B. CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, in SE-
LECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 77, 82 (1963) (legislatures implicitly assume fully
domestic context in enacting laws).
95. See B. CURRIE, supra note 93, at 178-79 (world with single system of law would not
require conflict of laws rules); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 88, § 1, Comment a
(ordinary court cases require reference only to law of forum); Von Mehren, supra note 92,
at 28-30 ("justice" can be achieved fully only when legal unit coincides with social or eco-
nomic unit within which problem arises).
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norm, blind application of domestic law is inadequate, and substan-
tial deference to the foreign system of authority may be appropri-
ate.
Both conflicts and exemption doctrine therefore require the
state to undertake the unaccustomed task of fixing boundaries
upon the application of its legal system. Conflict of laws rules are
devised to prevent parochialism from frustrating the needs of the
international system96 and to promote justice for individuals whose
activities cross national borders.97 Similarly, a coherent and gener-
ous scheme of religion-based exemptions would prevent parochial-
ism from unduly constricting the role of religion in society and
would promote justice for individuals caught between competing
authorities. Although the entire body of conflicts rules cannot be
transplanted into the free exercise clause, 98 the analogy, if pursued
carefully and selectively, could provide the basic structure for a new
exemption doctrine.
2. Territoriality in the Religious Context
An important distinction between conflict of laws and religion-
based exemptions is that the former can rely upon the fact of phys-
ical territoriality. The analogy can be pursued, however, by de-
vising standards for cognizable religious claims that in effect carve
out a "territory" for religious concerns and articulate conditions
96. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 88, § 6(2)(a) & Comment d (regard for
needs and policies of other states and for community of states furthers important goal of
conflicts); Cheatham & Maier, Private International Law and its Sources, 22 VAND. L. REv. 27,
95-97 (1968) (domestic law must be modified to meet needs of situations that confront it).
97. CHESHIRE, supra note 88, at 258 (unjust to hold person responsible for what would
be innocent act in place where it was committed); DIcEY, supra note 93, at 6-7 (just deter-
mination of rights must sometimes involve reference to foreign law).
Conflicts rules have two other goals. The first, achieving uniformity of result in order to
avoid forum shopping, see R. LEFLAR, supra note 88, § 103, at 205, is not relevant for pur-
poses of the analogy. The second goal, furthering the policies of the states involved, is cir-
cular: those policies may include limits on the application of domestic law. See RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 88, § 6(2)(b)-(c) & Comments e & f; Von Mehren, Recent
Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 927, 931 (1975) ("local-law theory"
of conflicts in itself provides no guidance as to when foreign law should be consulted).
98. Unreflective reference to the conflicts analogy may be particularly inappropriate
when extended beyond the context of religion-based exemptions. For example, courts of-
ten must interpret and apply foreign law in resolving a dispute between two private par-
ties, but the First Amendment forbids the courts from attempting to interpret religious
doctrine in the course of deciding disputes over church property. See Jones v. Wolf,
443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). Yet even here there is an imperfect analogue in conflicts doc-
trine, in that courts will sometimes refuse to hear a case in which applying the law that
would otherwise be applicable would pose special institutional problems. See Ramirez v.
Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, S.A. De C.V., 486 F.2d 493, 497 (5th Cir. 1973) (refusing
to attempt to apply unfamiliar remedial provisions of foreign law, and dismissing suit with-
out prejudice to bringing of action in different forum).
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that determine when persons are operating within that territory. 9
Establishment of such a territory would set boundaries upon the
application of the conflicting legal norms. A claim for a religion-
based exemption should therefore be thought of as an assertion
that certain behaviour should be governed by the law of the reli-
gious territory in which it occurred. 0 0
The parallel to territoriality suggests that one interest of the fo-
rum state may lead it to reject the religious exemption claim and
apply its own law: protection of third parties not subject to the reli-
gious authority who would be directly affected by the granting of
an exemption. Protection of third parties is distinctive, not because
it is the most compelling state interest, 1" but rather because in the
context of relations with third parties, the religious adherent's
claim that his conduct should be deemed to be within the jurisdic-
tion of the religious source of authority becomes untenable. Even if
a territory for religious concerns has been carved out and the reli-
gious proponent is subject to the source of authority for that terri-
tory, his action has recrossed the hypothetical boundary, and the
place of injury should determine the law to be applied. 02
99. Cf. Kelley, Confronting the Danger of the Moment, in CHURCH, STATE, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 9, 16-17 (J. Mechling ed. 1978) (discussing concept of "extraterritoriality" to guar-
antee autonomy for religious institutions).
100. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-83 (1934) (tort governed by law of
place where it occurred). Modern conflicts doctrine no longer suscribes to as strict a terri-
torial principle. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 88, § 86, at 173-74 (describing traditional theory
of "vested rights" and attacks upon it). Deviations from territorial considerations most of-
ten arise, however, when it is arguable that the site of a given event was fortuitous and
does not reflect the jurisdiction with which the event has the most significant relationship.
See CHESHIRE, supra note 88, at 260-63 (discussing principle of "proper law of the tort");
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 88, § 145, Comment e (discussing special problems
that arise when location of event is fortuitous). Given that the religious territory assumed
for purposes of the analogy is an abstraction, events never occur in it "fortuitously." In any
case, conflicts doctrine remains highly territorial in determining the basic wrongfulness of
conduct, see Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 483, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743, 751 (1963) (jurisdictions have strong interest in regulating conduct within their bor-
ders); Reese, American Trends in Private International Law: Academic and Judicial Manipulation
of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases, 33 VAND. L. REv. 717, 736 & n.46 (1980) (no case is
known in which law of state where conduct and injury occurred was not applied to deter-
mine whether conduct was tortious), and in its consideration of criminal law and govern-
mental claims, see R. LEFLAR, supra note 88, §§ 49, 115-16 (rules and qualifications), all of
which are subjects that most often generate claims for religion-based exemptions.
101. Under present free exercise doctrine, protection of third parties is recognized by
courts as a compelling interest. See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 630 (1943) (dictum) (state intervention required when freedoms asserted by individu-
als collide with rights asserted by other individuals); Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v.
O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 382-83 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd, No. 72-1826 (2d Cir. May 30,
1973) (unpublished order) (denying religious defense in suit for copyright infringement);
Clark, supra note 15, at 361 (discussing state interest in protecting third parties).
102. Cf. R. LEFLAR, supra note 88, §§ 111-114 (criminal liability for act generally deter-
mined by place of injury); RESTATMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 88, § 145 (rights and lia-
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Any religion-based exemption arguably has effects outside the
religious territory. For example, if a religious proponent is ex-
empted from a military draft, another person must arguably be
drafted in his place; if he is exempted from paying taxes, the tax
burden of other people arguably increases. Such arguments de-
pend, however, upon an assumption that domestic law actually
governs the activity in question. The territorial analogy is instruc-
tive. In a technical sense, not drafting residents of foreign coun-
tries has the effect of requiring more Americans to be drafted in
their place. This is not, however, perceived as an injury to any
American resident, for it is not assumed that foreigners are being
exempted from a law that should apply to them.'0 3 The conflicts
analogy suggests that persons with claims for religion-based ex-
emptions are much like these foreigners: their claims represent,
not dispensations from regulatory schemes, but rather recognition
of limits upon the application of those schemes.1 0 4
Similar analysis justifies ignoring a number of state interests that
are ordinarily very important. The conflicts analogy suggests that
state interests such as the goals of uniformity and fairness in the
application of law, as well as the state interest in preventing per-
sons from compromising their own moral or physical well-being,
are relevant to individuals only to the extent that those individuals
are perceived to be within the jurisdiction of the state. By carving
out a territory for religious concerns, and thereby recognizing cir-
cumstances in which religious persons are not within the jurisdic-
tion of the state, the doctrine of competing authorities would make
those state interests, not less important, but merely less relevant.
None of the state's interests need be diminished, however, when
such territorial carving-out is inappropriate. For all purposes ex-
cept their specific religious claims, religious persons do remain
within the jurisdiction of the state.10 5
bilities in relation to tort usually governed by place of injury, particularly if injured party
has significant relationship to that place). In the exemptions context, third parties have a
First Amendment right of their own not to be subject to the religious source of authority.
Cf. State v. Celmer, 80 N.J. 405, 404 A.2d I, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 951 (1979) (invalidating
conviction by municipal court controlled, under state grant, by religious association).
103. The distinction is similar to that often made between philosophical cause, which is
determined merely by the existence of a chain of events, and legally cognizable cause,
which is determined by the context of a set of normative expectations. See W. PROSSER,
LAW oF TORTS § 41, at 236-37 (4th ed. 1971).
104. Cf. Bittker, Churches, Taxes, and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1287-91 (1969)
(no more accurate to say that religious institutions are "exempted" from taxation than to
say that tax system, by purpose and structure, does not encompass taxation of religious in-
stitutions).
105. Thus, when the legislature creates nonpunitive alternative burdens, the courts
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III. Judicial Application of the Conflicts Approach
The conflict of laws analogy does not by itself create the specific
legal rules necessary for adjudication of exemption claims. The
analogy leaves undefined such pivotal concepts as "carving out a
religious territory" and "prejudice to third parties." The procedure
described below develops the insights of the analogy in order to
provide courts with a practical alternative to the current bal-
ancing test. The procedure narrows both the scope of cognizable
religious claims and the range of state interests that may overcome
those cognizable claims, while avoiding the pitfalls of the current
test.
A. Cognizable Religious Claims
The first step of the proposed procedure would be to examine
whether a claim to a religion-based exemption was cognizable. The
test has three components that, respectively, define the territories
of religious concern, determine whether the claimant has signifi-
cant connections with one of those territories, and decide whether
the source of authority perceived to be sovereign in that territory
has an interest in the matter.
1. Religious Systems of Authority
The argument for religion-based exemptions has here been
grounded upon the particular challenge to democratic authority
posed by the behavioral, authoritative, and transcendent attributes
of religious systems of belief. The test of cognizable religious claims
would therefore initially determine whether these attributes, rather
than merely individual conscience, were being invoked. In the con-
text of adjudicating exemption claims, religion would be defined as
a system of belief, not necessarily theistic or institutional, that con-
tained a source of authority perceived to transcend both the be-
liever and the state. This source of authority must be external to
personal belief or philosophy, no matter how strong or sincere,
and must have a reality and normative force analogous to that of a
foreign government.
This definition would be functional, not theological.10 6 It would
limit the scope of cognizable exemption claims by adopting stan-
should enforce them except against those individuals who have legitimate religious objec-
tions to the particular alternative burden.
106. Cf. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. RaV. 1056,
1066-67, 1075 (1978) (proposing functional definition of religion drawn from concern for
"inviolability of conscience").
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dards derived directly from the justification for the exemptions.' 0 7
Systems of belief that did not meet the definition would fail to
support claims, not because they were less worthy of respect, but
simply because they did not pose the same challenge to democratic au-
thority.
2. Life Context
If a religious system of authority were involved, the test would
next consider whether the claimant's life context justified his at-
tempt to invoke that authority. One element of this inquiry would
involve the screening of fraudulent claims, 08 especially in situa-
tions in which an exemption would be in the person's secular self-
interest. For example, if an ostensible religious group were to ap-
pear that objected to payment of any taxes, evidence that it re-
cruited members by promising that they would be able to avoid
taxes, and that it had little impact upon their lives other than that
promise, would justify denial of an exemption. 0 9 In order to pre-
vent the inquiry from acting as a vehicle for inappropriate preju-
dices, the government would bear the burden of proving fraudu-
lent intent.
Beliefs can be sincerely held, however, without being part of a
larger religious commitment. An inquiry into the claimant's life
context would therefore include an examination of whether a
nexus existed between his particular belief and a general intent to
be governed by the religious source of authority. For some reli-
gious systems of authority, such an examination could involve an
attempt to identify enough overt behaviour to substantiate the pro-
ponent's claim, without engaging in an impermissible inquiry into
the nature of religious orthodoxy." 0 Thus, a person who based his
107. The limited purpose of the definition implies that a different meaning could be
ascribed to religion for purposes of the general application of the free exercise clause. The
establishment clause might require yet a third definition. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 18, §
14-6, at 827-28 (arguing that free exercise and establishment clauses require different defi-
nitions of religion); Note, supra note 106, at 1083-86 (same).
108. The standard proposed here is similar in some respects to the sincerity component
of present doctrine, United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (court may inquire into
good faith, but not truth or falsity of religious belief), but it focuses more narrowly upon
an affirmative proof of fraud rather than upon an attempt to measure the intensity of be-
liefs. Cf. id. at 92-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (sincerity test dangerous to religious liberty).
109. Similar fraudulent religious claims for the purpose of evading taxes are possible
under present tax statutes and have not proved their unworking. Cf. Kurtz, Difflwult Def/Mi-
tional Problems in Tax Administration: Religion and Race, 23 CATH. LAV. 301, 305 (1978)
(describing scheme to exploit religious exemptions).
110. See p. 360 supra (courts should not try to find essence of particular religion).
Courts should not demand that religious behaviour satisfy their perception of consistency.
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claim for exemption upon adherence to a particular tenet of an or-
ganized religion that encompassed a collection of distinctive ritual
or moral directives, would also have to demonstrate adherence to
at least some set of those directives. For other religious systems of
belief, which did not lend themselves to such a behaviour-oriented
test, the averment of the claimant would often have to suffice."1 ' A
final prong of the life-context inquiry would be consideration of
factors such as childhood' 1 2 or mental disability" 3 that cast doubt
upon the proponent's intent to be subject to the religious system of
authority.
3. Ambit of Religious Authority
Finally, the test would ask whether the specific religious claim
fell within the ambit of the religious source of authority. The test
of the religious character of a belief would be whether it was per-
ceived to receive its imperative power from the transcendent
religious source of authority: only such a status would pose the
particular challenge to democratic authority recognized by the
competing authorities justification.
This portion of the test would not involve difficult inquiries into
centrality" 4 or into the doctrinal pedigree of particular religious
beliefs."' Similarly, a religion's pardon of violation of its laws co-
erced by conflicting civil law would not justify denial of an exemp-
Cf. Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration under Title VII, 69
MICH. L. REv. 599, 615-16 (1971) (citing example of Jews who keep kosher homes but eat
nonkosher food away from home).
111. The life-context test is akin to a determination of domicile in conflicts doctrine. Cf.
R. LEFLAR, supra note 88, § 10 (discussing requirement of physical presence coinciding with
state of mind).
112. Cf. R. LEFLAR, supra note 88, § 12 (children generally cannot choose their own
domicile). Depending upon maturity and intelligence, some minors may be capable of
forming an intent to be bound by the religious source of authority. Nevertheless, the state
should have the right to use age as a trigger for an inquiry into such capacity. Cf. Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion) (state may require parental consent for
minor to obtain abortion, but must provide alternative procedure in which minor can dem-
onstrate to court either that she is mature and well-informed enough to make decision or
that abortion would be in her best interests).
113. Cf. R. LEFLAR, supra note 88, § 13 (mental incompetent may not have capacity to
choose own domicile). As in the case of children, particularized inquiry would be necessary.
Cf. Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644, 1657 (1979) (courts re-
fuse to single out mentally disabled person for distinct treatment unless disability is shown
to affect capacity in question).
114. See p. 360 supra (criticizing inquiry into centrality).
115. See note 56 supra (criticizing pedigree tests). A religious community will often per-
ceive part of its ordained duty to be the interpretation of doctrine. See, e.g., J. HOSTrLER,
supra note 83, at 58-59 (describing establishment of "ordnung" in Amish church); Dorff,
supra note 81, at 1334-41 (describing process of interpreting Jewish law).
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tion to adherents of that religion. 1 6 The inquiry would, however,
exclude claims that were based upon the institutional interests of
religious groups rather than upon religious doctrine. 17
B. Relevant State Interests
The three-pronged test of religious interests would establish
religion-based exemptions as limited and specialized exceptions
within the fabric of democratic authority. Nevertheless, one inter-
est of the larger community would overcome even cognizable reli-
gious claims: protection of third parties.
The principle of third-party injury would arise in cases of direct
prejudice to the legal rights of identifiable third parties who were
not subject to the religious source of authority." 8 A general test of
116. See p. 361 supra (criticizing this distinction). Exemptions would be denied if the re-
ligion, out of a theological judgment regarding the legitimate role of the state, incorpo-
rated all or part of civil law into its religious doctrine. See, e.g., M. LUTHER, Temporal Author-
ity: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed, in 45 LUTHER'S WORKS 75, 92 (Am. ed. 1962) (civil
government necessary to bring about external peace and prevent evil deeds); Romans 13:1
("Let everyone be subject to the higher authorities, for ... [they] have been appointed by
God.") But if the religion excuses violation of religious doctrine because of a conviction
that subjection to the civil penalty is a greater evil, or out of a desire to keep peace with
the civil authority, that decision should not destroy the religious claim of right. See, e.g., L.
ARRINGTON & D. BrIrON, THE MORMON EXPERIENCE 179-84 (1979) (after persecution of
Mormons for belief in polygamy, Mormon leaders urged submission to anti-polygamy laws
for "temporal salvation of the church"); CHRISTIAN SCIENCE COMIrRE ON PUBLICATIONS,
FACTS ABOUT CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 10 (1959), quoted in Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment
and the Free Exercise of Religion, 42 IND. L.J. 386, 386 n.2 (1967) (though Christian Scientists
obey laws requiring medical treatment of children, they seek legal recognition of right to
rely upon Christian Science healing); S. FREEHOF, A TREASURY OF RESPONSA 184 (1962)
(some practices otherwise prohibited by Jewish law allowed in order to keep peace with
civil authorities).
The problem dealt with here is similar to the question of "renvoi" in conflicts doctrine:
whether, in referring to the laws of another state, a court should also look to the choice-of-
law rules of that state. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 88, § 8 (reference to
other state's choice-of-law rules usually not appropriate).
117. Such claims are not justified by the competing-authorities approach, since the reli-
gious source of authority, not the religious institution, transcends the state. For example, in
Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 181 Colo. 411, 509 P.2d 1250 (1973), the
court attempted to establish standards by which a religious group could prevent condem-
nation of its church building under the free exercise clause. Those standards, however,
relied more upon the historical and sentimental significance of the church building than
the specific doctrinal beliefs of the church members. See Note, The Lord Buildeth and the
State Taketh Away-Church Condemnation and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 46 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 43, 50 (1974). The non-entanglement element of establishment clause doc-
trine should suffice to protect those institutional interests that are necessary to religious lib-
erty. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (upholding right
of religious group to autonomy in internal government); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397
U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption of religious institutions prevents greater evil of excessive
entanglement).
118. See p. 368supra (justifying concern for direct injury to third parties).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 90: 350, 1980
such legal prejudice would be the existence of a hypothetical right
of action by that third party against the exempt individual."l 9
The third-party principle would place outside the range of
religion-based exemptions crimes and civil wrongs such as murder,
trespass, and breach of contract. It would also permit enforcement
of social regulations such as fair labor standards and civil rights
laws, but only if the religious defendant conducted himself in a
market outside the particular religious faith to which he be-
longed. 120 Thus, intervention in the consensual relationships of the
religious group would unnecessarily invade the territory of reli-
gious concern. 2 '
The third-party rule would require some qualifications to cope
with situations in which the operational test might be misleading.
First, absence of an injured third party would not bar prosecutions
of attempted crimes.' 2 2 Second, when the institution of govern-
ment itself is an injured third party, and not merely a competing
source of authority, it should have rights analogous to those of
119. Rights of action are generally created in favor of persons who have been damaged
by another's violation of a legal duty. See B. SHIPMAN, COMMON-LAW PLEADINGS § 77, at
196-97 (3d ed. 1923); cf. Hodge v. Service Machine Co., 438 F.2d 347, 349 (6th Cir. 1971)
(cause of action does not exist until plaintiff suffers legally cognizable damages); Kane v.
Nomad Mobile Homes, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 2d 17, 228 N.E.2d 207 (1967) (finding of legal
wrong without damage must lead to verdict for defendant).
The private right of action standard would be applied functionally rather than mechani-
cally. The state should not be able to evade it by creating private rights of action when no
injury has been sustained. Conversely, if a private right of action were barred for some
procedural reason, it would not cease to be a "hypothetical right of action." The existence
of a private right of action would trigger the state's right to pursue whatever remedies are
available to it. Allowing the state to intervene would be necessary to afford the potentially
injured party his full measure of protection.
120. In Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978), a racially segregated private religious school attempted to
block a private civil rights action under 42 U.S.C._§ 1981 (1976). The Court held that the
discriminatory practices of the school were matters of policy rather than religion. Id. at 313.
A concurring opinion argued that the belief was religious, but was overcome by a compel-
ling state interest. Id. at 320, 322. The procedure proposed in this Note would have allowed
the court to focus more directly on evidence that the school's students were not limited to
those in families of church members and that the school advertised in the "yellow pages."
Id. at 311.
121. The territoriality metaphor is especially appropriate in considering such relation-
ships: a group of persons has voluntarily entered a sphere in which their rights and obliga-
tions are determined by a distinct set of legal norms. Cf. Note, Title VII and the Appointment
of Women Clergy: A Statutory and Constitutional Quagmire, 13 COLUsM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 257,
286-88 (1977) (women seeking to become priests have impliedly consented to their reli-
gion's discriminatory practices).
122. This exception is justified by the same rationale that underlies the crime of at-
tempt itself: if a person has substantially completed an effort to commit a punishable act,
the state should not have to wait for him to cause actual injury before it can stop him and
take punitive measures. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAw § 59, at 426-27 (1972).
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other persons. 123 Finally, the existence of a legally prejudiced third
party should in some cases be insufficient to deny an exemption.
This is most obvious when the injury to the third party is minimal
or nominal.124 This third caveat would also apply when the pri-
mary purpose of the legal rule was to influence the behaviour of
the religious proponent rather than to do justice to the third
party,1 25 or when a religion-based exemption could, without undue
distortion, be justified by the logic of the relevant legal standard. 126
C. Comparative Advantages of the Proposed Test
The new procedure would not be a mere variant of the balanc-
ing test; rather, a claim of exemption would be recognized only if it
passed the test of religious interest and did not fall into the con-
crete and limited category of government interest. The proposed
test addresses the distinctive features of the exemption context and
overcomes the specific failures that dominate current doctrine.
First, the theoretical underpinnings of the test suggest responses to
basic objections that religion-based exemptions are inconsistent
with the rule of law, notions of equal treatment, and the establish-
ment clause. To the extent that the analysis uncovers limits upon
the application of domestic law, and argues for deference to other
legal systems, the rule of law is left uncompromised. To the extent
that religious persons are potentially subject to two systems of au-
thority, the goal of equal treatment within one of those systems can
123. Cf. Note, Protecting the Public Interest: Nonstatutory Suits by the United States, 89 YALE
L.J. 118, 120-21 (1979) (distinguishing government rights of action analogous to those af-
forded private parties from other government interests to which parallel cannot be ap-
plied). Thus, theft from the government is as much a direct injury to an identifiable third
party as theft from a private individual. Furthermore, the fact that a crime against the in-
stitution of government is separately enumerated, and perhaps defined or punished in a
way not completely parallel to crimes against private individuals, should not affect the
state's right to protect itself against direct injury. Thus, prosecution for conversion of gov-
ernment property, forgery of government documents, and similar acts should not be
blocked by religion-based exemptions.
124. Cf. TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (statute requiring employers to make
"reasonable accommodations" to employee's religious beliefs does not require more than
minimal expenditures or disruption of procedures).
Such a de minimis standard would isolate those circumstances in which private rights of
action do not reflect true direct injury. See note 119 supra (discussing usual meaning of
"right of action"). The exemption would be a narrow one so as to avoid reintroducing a
balancing test to the procedure.
125. In such cases, the relevant norm is that imposed by religious law. Cf. RESTATEMENT
OF CONFLICTS, supra note 88, § 145, Comment c (distinguishing deterrence and compensa-
tion purposes of tort rules).
126. Cf. Note, Medical Care, Freedom of Religion, and Mitigation of Damages, 87 YALE L.J.
1466, 1479-81 (1978) (allowing religion-based exemption to mitigation of damages require-
ment in tort suits would conform to principles of underlying requirement).
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reasonably give way to a just accommodation between them. Fin-
ally, to the extent that exemptions are characterized as responses
to one of the dilemmas of a legally heterogeneous world, rather
than as gratuitous preferences for the consciences of religious
persons, the establishment clause is not seriously threatened. 127
Second, unlike current doctrine, the proposed test does not re-
sort to weighing of the relative importance of every law from which
an exemption is claimed. Rather, it categorizes laws by use of func-
tional arguments tied to an underlying analysis unrelated to partic-
ular legislative judgments.
Third, the test does not intrude excessively upon religious auton-
omy. The test establishes standards for cognizable religious claims,
but once a claim meets those standards, its religious character is not
subject to further weighing and probing. The standards themselves
are straightforward and functional, and they avoid intrusive in-
quiries into centrality or doctrinal pedigree. Moreover, the test is
concerned with vindicating religious claims of right, rather than
monitoring how much suffering particular laws cause individuals.
Finally, the clear parameters established by the proposed test
would reduce the probability of ill-conceived or biased decisions.
Factual uncertainties and borderline cases would still arise, but
their difficulty would be minimized by the combination of a clear
underlying theory and a specific set of legal standards.
127. No doctrine of religion-based exemptions could satisfy adherents of the view that
the establishment clause forbids government from ever taking religion into account. Cf.
Kurland, supra note 44, at 95-96 (advocating "strict neutrality"). But the Supreme Court
has never adopted this absolutist position. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 14-4, at 820-21.
The competing authorities approach does, however, demonstrate the particular challenge
posed by religious claims for exemptions, cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664
(1970) (statutory tax exemptions of religious institutions permissible because they prevent
greater harm of excessive entanglement), while placing those exemptions in a context that
renders them less anomalous and gratuitous, cf. Bittker, supra note 104, at 1295 (non-
profit institutions other than religious institutions also receive statutory tax exemptions).
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